Conversation with Bernard L Schwarty by Cohen, Philip H. & Schwarty, Bernard L.
University of Mississippi
eGrove
Touche Ross Publications Deloitte Collection
1969
Conversation with Bernard L Schwarty
Philip H. Cohen
Bernard L. Schwarty
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/dl_tr
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Deloitte Collection at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Touche Ross
Publications by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tempo, Vol. 15, no. 4 (1969, winter), p. 04-12
Nine years ago Saul P. Steinberg, then fresh from col-
lege, had a new idea in computer leasing. He parlayed 
that idea into Leasco Data Processing Equipment Cor-
poration, a dynamic international organization whose 
merger plans are grabbing headlines in the major busi-
ness press. 
Here Bernard L. Schwartz, Chairman of Leasco's Ex-
ecutive Committee and Mr. Steinberg's confidant, dis-
cusses Leasco's fantastic growth and the philosophy 
behind its recent mergers with Touche Ross partner 
Philip H. Cohen. Mr. Cohen and Mr. Schwartz have been 
working with Leasco since it was small enough to be run 
from Mr. Steinberg's kitchen table. 
Philip H. Cohen 
COHEN: 
Leasco began in 1961 with an initial capitalization of 
about $25,000 in cash. Today it is a company with assets 
of more than one billion dollars, stockholders' equity of 
more than $250 million, and has grown from a small in-
come to approximately $44 million in the current year— 
after including capital gains from the insurance opera-
tion. How do you account for this phenomenal growth? 
SCHWARTZ: 
There are several things. First of all, we have the easy, 
almost cliche answer—hard work. Second, we had a 
concept as to where our company should be going. Al-
though starting out in the computer leasing business, we 
are proceeding in the concept of a broad-based com-
puter and financial services, problem-solving organiza-
tion. It is with this concept in mind that we geared our 
external growth at Leasco. 
Bernard L. Schwartz 
COHEN: 
But this growth was not all through computer leasing. 
You've been on a campaign to acquire companies. How 
do you relate that to your overall concept? 
SCHWARTZ: 
Of course, much of our growth did come through ac-
quisitions and mergers, and it is important to note that 
in every case our acquisitions were happy ones in that 
we achieved some synergistic value. In other words, the 
companies did well, or they fit into a particular pattern; 
they filled a void of business activity that we felt we 
should be involved in. 
In addition, it is important to emphasize that Leasco's 
attitude toward acquisitions is a result of a "make or 
buy" decision. This decision is based upon intensive 
study of the industry, the competition, the potential 
candidates for acquisition in this industry, and all other 
pertinent information applicable to that particular trans-
action. We have a Corporate Development Department 
under our vice president of corporate planning, Mike 
Gibbs, which is constantly reviewing all our business 
functions and activities and identifying those business 
areas which are desirable and profitable extensions for 
our efforts. After it identifies an industry, it analyzes the 
entire group and the competitive standing of each of the 
major companies in that industry. 
Having made a decision to expand in a particular di-
rection, we then measure the feasibility of developing 
internally or acquiring. Some of the considerations that 
enter into that measurement are Leasco's financial re-
sources, human resources, the time factor in develop-
ing-as against acquiring, the management depth and 
strength of available companies, and the availability of 
industry talent—and generally, the cost (including time) 
of each approach. Generally, we prefer to develop our-
selves, but we will acquire when the "make or buy" deci-
sion indicates that "buy" is more desirable. 
COHEN: 
It seems to me you did not make any significant "buy" 
decisions until Documentation, Inc. in 1967. What at-
tracted you to a software company—and why Docu-
mentation, Inc.? 
SCHWARTZ: 
Documentation, Inc. is more accurately described as 
an information technology company, rather than a soft-
ware company. It had developed computer-based tech-
niques of information storage, retrieval and dissemina-
tion of data in printed form, microfiche and microfilm. 
As you pointed out, it was a departure from computer 
leasing, but it certainly fit in with our overall concept of 
developing a computer services organization. 
We viewed the disciplines they had developed over 
many years to be an important base for the development 
of a total information capability, including computer 
timesharing. Documentation, Inc. was a mature com-
pany, profitable, had a high degree of professionalism, 
and enjoyed an excellent reputation in the field in which 
it had become a factor. Its attractions to us were obvious. 
COHEN: 
How about Reliance (Insurance Co.)? Why did Leasco, 
which was then a growing company but not a giant, 
decide that an insurance company was a company to 
acquire, when that industry is known for being static and 
conservative rather than growth-oriented? 
SCHWARTZ: 
First of all, we did not see anything inconsistent in 
combining an insurance company with a financial serv-
ices and computer services business. Reliance Insur-
ance Company was a particularly attractive company 
in the property and casualty field. Long before we con-
sidered Reliance in particular, we made a complete 
study of the property and casualty field. We were struck 
by the fact that this was an industry that lost money in 
its main operation, that is, its insurance operation, but 
made money in its investments. 
The industry had created redundant capital (surplus 
monies that were not utilized in the functioning of its 
business), and many of the insurance companies were 
looking then to create insurance holding companies so 
these surplus funds could be used for better returns in 
areas outside the property and casualty industry. Many 
of them had expressed an interest in getting into the 
fields we had already identified as of interest to us. So it 
seemed a natural fit for Leasco to merge with a com-
pany that had adequate funds to be used in those areas 
of activity. 
" . . . Accounting has 
a very great influence on the 
form of a merger. 
But a merger must stand 
on whether it's a good 
business deal the most 
important consideration is for 
the transaction to make 
good business sense . . . 
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COHEN: 
I can see where these fit into your concept, but I imag-
ine you and Saul (Steinberg, Chairman of the Board) get 
a number of questions—especially during the Chemical 
Bank incident—about whether you are a conglomerate. 
How do you answer them? 
SCHWARTZ: 
The fact of the matter is we are not a conglomerate, if 
I understand what a conglomerate is. For example, if you 
were to bring us a candidate for acquisition that had 
great return on invested capital, terrific gross profit 
margins and margins on sales, good management, and 
continuity and stability—but made hub-caps—Leasco 
would not be interested. A conglomerate might be inter-
ested. We have a concept of what our company should 
be; unless a new activity can bring additional strengths 
and capabilities to our existing structure, we are not in-
clined to make acquisitions. 
At one time we did consider the banking industry to be 
a natural extension of the financial services end of our 
business. Many banks are involved in the same business 
as Leasco, such as computer services, equipment leas-
ing and insurance. 
Of course, any decision to enter the banking field must 
take into careful consideration the proposed changes in 
legislation affecting bank mergers and non-banking ac-
tivities for bank holding companies. Until the legislative 
picture is clarified, the banking industry is certainly not 
on a front burner for an extension of our financial serv-
ices activities. 
COHEN: 
Your acquisition of Pergamon Press (Ltd. of London) 
has received considerable publicity in the newspapers, 
too. It has been a most on-again-off-again acquisition, 
and the outcome is still not settled. 
SCHWARTZ: 
It has been an interesting situation. In fact, it is a good 
argument for why fundamentals should be followed in 
an acquisition. As you know, we now own approximately 
38% of the stock of Pergamon and we have had to delay 
our bid for the acquisition of the remainder of the stock. 
It became necessary for us to delay our tender offer for 
the remainder of the outstanding stock pending a deter-
mination of the actual earnings for 1968 and 1969. 
As you know, Pergamon is a dominant factor in the 
publication of scientific books and journals. Its potential 
could only be maximized by developing capabilities that 
Leasco is expert in: computer and information tech-
niques. Pergamon was uniquely positioned for the de-
velopment of an international scientific data bank which 
would have an internal tie-in to our plans for timesharing. 
Accordingly, we had not only identified publishing as one 
of our main areas of interest for development, we had 
particularly focused upon Pergamon as a potential can-
didate for acquisition. 
Saul Steinberg had met Robert Maxwell in London 
and had some very preliminary, exploratory discussions 
with him. In subsequent discussions we structured a deal 
with Maxwell whereby Leasco would tender for all the 
Pergamon outstanding shares; Maxwell agreed to sup-
port our bid and tender the stock that he owned and con-
trolled (approximately 36%). As you remember, Perga-
mon is a public company listed on the London Stock 
Exchange; they in turn own 70% of an American com-
pany called Pergamon Press, Inc. The balance of the 
American company is owned by the public. 
We have a specific and well-thought-out technique in 
making acquisitions. Whenever possible, we attempt to 
conduct a full investigation of the proposed company 
prior to entering into a contract. Of course, sometimes 
that is impossible when, for one reason or another, the 
other company refuses to make available its books and 
records prior to signing a contract. In those cases, we 
always investigate after signing the contract and before 
closing the transaction. Among other reasons, the pur-
pose of the investigation is to verify the financial data 
on which valuations are based. 
Another protection that we seek is for the manage-
ment of the other company to warrant the accuracy and 
completeness of the financial data submitted to us dur-
ing our negotiations. 
Maxwell pointed out that the securing of warranties 
and the right to prior investigation was not normal pro-
cedure in making tender offers for public companies in 
England. However, we insisted on this protection and, 
as it turned out, it was fortunate that we did so. 
Tender offers for public companies in England are 
quite a serious business, and it is not commonplace that 
—once an offer has been announced—that it be re-
voked. Having announced our offer, and during our in-
vestigation, we did take a position of purchasing 38% 
of the Pergamon stock in the open market. We had ob-
tained the necessary clearance from the Bank of Eng-
land to do so. We felt that the purchase of this stock was 
not an inordinate risk and would give us an important 
standing in the subsequent tender offer. Our judgment 
was based upon what appeared to be accurate financial 
information that was available. We had reviewed the 
certified statements of Pergamon for the last eight years, 
as well as examined the annual reports of both Perga-
mon Press, Ltd., and Pergamon Press, Inc. In addition, 
Pergamon and its investment bankers had made a fore-
cast of the 1969 earnings. Incidentally, earnings fore-
casts are considered to be standard procedure for any 
company in preparation of a proxy statement because 
they are regarded seriously. The company's investment 
banker and auditors usually pass judgment on the ac-
counting principles on which the forecast is based. You 
may recall that in the latter part of 1968, Pergamon was 
involved in a well-publicized but unsuccessful bid for 
"News of the World" and, during that fight, it was gen-
erally regarded that all pertinent information regarding 
Pergamon had been fully reported in the news media. 
Accordingly, we felt that sufficient information was 
available for us to rely on. This information, of course, 
included the certified statements prepared by independ-
ent auditors. 
However, serious doubts about the 1968 and 1969 
earnings developed during the course of our examina-
tion. I might say, Phil, that my conversations with you 
and Eddie Heft (Touche Ross partner) in outlining the 
scope of our investigation, and the help your organiza-
tion rendered during that time was extremely useful. 
Two of your people should be particularly singled out: 
Ian Irvine and Page Thibodeaux (partners in Europe), 
who went through some very trying times in attempting to 
secure the necessary information from a reticent Perga-
mon management. Just as an aside, it was necessary to 
rearrange working habits during this transaction; our 
negotiations generally started about 6 p.m. and hit a 
stride at about three in the morning. 
At any rate, it became apparent that the reported earn-
ings for 1968 and the 1969 forecast were considerably 
overstated. Consequently, our bid became over-valued. 
This and other considerations caused us to announce the 
revocation of our bid. At the current time, independent 
auditors are conducting an investigation of the 1968 and 
1969 accounts. At the completion of their report, Leasco 
will prepare a bid for the outstanding stock, based on 
their findings. 
COHEN: 
Bernie, you are aware the Accounting Principles 
Board is considering potential amortization of goodwill, 
and is putting restrictions on the concept of pooling. 
How do you feel these will affect your acquisition pro-
gram? 
SCHWARTZ: 
Well, I can't say flatly that the accounting has no in-
fluence on our decisions as to whether we do a merger. 
It certainly has a very great influence on the form of a 
merger. But in almost every case a merger or acquisition 
must stand on whether it's a good business deal, and 
accounting is only a tool for putting the deal together. 
It would be a mistake, I think, for companies to make 
deals because financially—or accounting-wise—they 
get a short-term plus if the business deal is not a good 
one to support it long range. The most important con-
sideration is for the transaction to make good business 
sense. 
I have very strong feelings about the accountants' at-
titude toward pooling. Although it is not a perfect tool, 
in some instances it is better than purchase accounting. 
My objection to the purchase concept is that it does not 
give the prudent investor as much information as pool-
ing about what the company will look like after the 
merger. Further, to have the assets of the company in-
flated by an artificial number (goodwill), and then charge 
future earnings by the amortization of that artificial 
value, is not consistent with the economic realities. 
COHEN: 
Take a specific case, say Reliance. How do you think 
purchase or pooling would have affected that trans-
action? 
SCHWARTZ: 
As you know, we treated that acquisition as a pooling 
and such treatment was consistent with the general 
rules. We had acquired over 95% of the voting stock 
of Reliance through an exchange of our equity securities 
(voting preferred and warrants to purchase common 
stock). The management continuity of each company 
was shared and top executives of both companies 
served in the active management of each other's offices 
as part of the executive structure and boards of direc-
tors. Although the question of pooling versus purchase 
accounting would have considerably affected the report-
ing results of the combined companies, the actual trans-
action was a consequence of business considerations 
and was achieved through active negotiation prior to the 
merger. These considerations included the taxability of 
the transaction, the dividend rate, and the no-call feature 
of the preferred stock and the term of the warrant. The 
result of the transaction afforded us the use of pooling 
so that the combined operations of the company would 
be consistent with the past reporting of Leasco and Reli-
ance. In addition, the combined reports would be con-
sistent with those of many other financial organizations. 
I realize that questions have been raised with respect 
to the reporting of capital gains in the Reliance portfolio. 
However, this problem does not arise because of the 
pooling technique. It arises by virtue of an inconsistent 
policy of handling stock-investment portfolios by various 
financial organizations (insurance companies, banks, 
etc.). On balance, pooling presents a much more precise 
tool in presenting a fair picture of our combined opera-
tions. 
COHEN: 
Bernard, it is now five years since the start of your 
acquisition program; we all know nobody is 100 percent 
successful... 
SCHWARTZ: 
We have had more good scores than bad—a few we 
were interested in got away, but almost every acquisi-
tion has met the criteria we outlined prior to the trans-
action. The additional capabilities we obtained in the 
process, in most cases, would have been substantially 
more costly to develop by ourselves and have enabled 
us to grow into a major factor in the business activities 
in which we are engaged. Leasco is truly an international 
corporation with over 9,000 employees and over $1 bil-
lion in assets. So, on balance, I can say we have had a 
successful pattern. 
In passing, Phil, I think it is appropriate to talk about 
another phase in any acquisition program, and that is 
the hard work after the negotiations are finished. Signifi-
cant problems, depending upon the size of the acquisi-
tion, need to be solved in order to maximize the benefits 
for the combined companies. These problems have to 
do with organization, people relationships, questions of 
integrating similar functions, eliminating duplications, 
equalizing payroll incentive and fringe benefits, devel-
oping harmonious accounting—in short, reorganizing all 
the functions of running a business. We have found that 
the investment in people and effort in this phase is highly 
rewarding. It demands much hand-holding, understand-
ing and operating skills. At Leasco we have developed a 
highly professional and well-motivated staff with ex-
pertise in the various areas of corporate activity. The 
effort has paid off in terms of creating a total corporate 
team with well-defined goals. In spite of the very active 
acquisition and internal development programs that 
Leasco has pursued, we have emerged a fully integrated 
company. 
COHEN: 
Yes, it appears that you have effectively integrated 
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Reliance, for example—and from a shaky start. I remem-
ber that Bill Roberts (president of Reliance) was op-
posing you quite vigorously at the beginning. 
SCHWARTZ: 
Mr. Roberts was a successful manager of a good com-
pany and was not interested in merging with anybody. 
His reaction against Leasco was typical of any action he 
would have taken against any attempted merger. How-
ever, after we met with Bill several times and demon-
strated that we had sound concepts for the management 
and direction of the joint operations of our companies, 
I think he recognized the virtues of our association. 
Still Roberts negotiated hard for his stockholders. As 
you remember in the Reliance situation, we changed the 
package after we met with him to make our preferred 
stock five years and no call, and we lowered our con-
version price from 100 to 90. That was due to our nego-
tiations. 
Also, we agreed not to interfere with the operations in 
the insurance end for five years. Roberts felt that he and 
his associates could continue in the insurance end to do 
what had to be dorfe, and we agreed wholeheartedly. 
Today Bill Roberts is not only on our board of direc-
tors, but sits on our Management Review Committee. It 
is important for all of our managers to recognize that this 
is a partnership effort, and Bill has responded to that 
climate by being a full participant. 
COHEN: 
Many people have commented that Leasco has been 
fortunate in being able to attract, and keep, good people. 
Do you have a secret for this success? 
SCHWARTZ: 
Generally, there are three. We have been able to 
create an environment of excitement. Leasco has been 
a successful company. There are few companies that 
have been built up as fast and as well as we, so we have 
been a dynamic company and successful people want 
to be with successful companies that are doing things. 
Second, all of our key people have equity positions in 
the company, either with stock options, or through stock 
purchases. More than 10% of the entire equity of the 
company is represented by stock options. Our people 
are not only interested from the point of view of environ-
ment, but they are interested from the point of view of 
helping their own equity. 
And third, we have an atmosphere in which all ideas 
are welcome, regardless of the source. People here have 
" . . . (Robert) Maxwell pointed out 
the securing of warranties and 
the right to prior investigation was not 
normal procedure.. . However, we insisted 
on the protection, and as it turned out, 
it was fortunate we did so . . . " 
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the opportunity to see translated into fruitful actions the 
suggestions they make—and that is an important motiva-
tion for them. We have been fortunate also in receiving 
valuable help from our professional people. You know 
Touche Ross was our first accountant after we became 
public, and your people have taken as great an interest 
in us as our own people have. We get the kind of service 
and the advice that we have been able to rely on. That 
has helped us to be so successful. 
COHEN: 
Well, Bernie, we've talked about a number of major 
acquisitions—and you've had more than 15. What are the 
plans for the future, not as to specific companies, but 
certainly as to prospects for further acquisitions? 
SCHWARTZ: 
I think the company after only eight years has matured 
in terms of identifying the direction it is going. We will 
continue to investigate many areas and to identify those 
that we should be involved in. But our most immediate 
effort is the computer services business. In the near 
future we will be interested in making acquisitions only 
to fill gaps. I was going to make a prediction but like all 
predictions, I don't know if it will come true, but . . . I 
don't think in the next 12 or 13 months we will make 
acquisitions at the rate we have in the past. Our program 
has been very successful up to now, and we filled in 
many of the gaps. 
COHEN: 
What you're saying then is that these companies have 
a good future profit potential and you want to develop 
your acquired companies to the fullest. 
SCHWARTZ: 
Absolutely. Just to give you an example, we acquired 
one company a year ago. At the time the merger was 
consummated, the consideration was 27 times earnings. 
Today, based on the consideration we gave them at that 
time (but in relation to the earnings that they made this 
year), we paid nine times earnings, and on next year's 
anticipated earnings, it will probably be about four to 
five times earnings. Now that's a successful acquisition 
and I suppose we will always be interested in an acquisi-
tion that will perform similarly. 
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